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ABOUT THE
CHILDREN
ACHIEVING
CHALLENGE
In February 1995 shortly after the
School Board of Philadelphia adopted
Children Achieving as a systemic reform
agenda to improve the Philadelphia
public schools, the Annenberg
Foundation designated Philadelphia as
one of a few American cities to receive
a five-year $50 million Annenberg
Challenge grant to improve public
education.
Among the conditions for receiving the
grant was a requirement to raise two
matching dollars ($100 million over five
years) for each one received from the
Annenberg Foundation and to create
an independent management structure
to provide program, fiscal, and
evaluation oversight of the grant. In
Philadelphia, a business organization,
Greater Philadelphia First, assumed this
responsibility, and with it, the challenge
of building and sustaining civic support
for the improvement of public
education in the city.
Philadelphia’s Children Achieving was a
sweeping systemic reform initiative.
Systemic reform eschews a school-byschool approach to reform and relies on
coherent policy, improved coordination
of resources and services, content and
performance standards,
decentralization of decision-making,
and accountability mechanisms to
transform entire school systems. Led by

v

a dynamic superintendent and central
office personnel, Children Achieving
was the first attempt by an urban
district to test systemic reform in
practice.

EVALUATION OF
CHILDREN
ACHIEVING
In 1996 the Consortium for Policy
Research in Education (CPRE) at the
University of Pennsylvania and its
partner, Research for Action (RFA) were
charged by the Children Achieving
Challenge with the evaluation of
Children Achieving. Between the 19951996 and 2000-2001 school years,
CPRE and RFA researchers interviewed
hundreds of teachers, principals,
parents, students, district officials, and
civic leaders; sat in on meetings where
the plan was designed, debated, and
revised; observed its implementation in
classrooms and schools; conducted two
system-wide surveys of teachers; and
carried out independent analyses of the
District’s test results and other
indicators of system performance. An
outline of the research methods used
by CPRE and RFA is included in this
report. A listing of the reports on
Children Achieving currently available
from CPRE is found below. There will
be several additional reports released
in the coming months. New reports will
be listed and available as they are
released on the CPRE web site at
www.gse.upenn.edu/cpre/.

vi

CHILDREN
ACHIEVING’S
THEORY OF ACTION
To assess the progress and effects of a
comprehensive reform such as Children
Achieving, it is essential to understand
its “theory of action,” that is, the
assumptions made about what actions
or behaviors will produce the desired
effects. A summary of the Children
Achieving theory of action follows:
Given high academic standards and
strong incentives to focus their efforts
and resources; more control over
school resource allocations,
organization, policies, and programs;
adequate funding and resources; more
hands-on leadership and high-quality
support; better coordination of
resources and programs; schools
restructured to support good teaching
and encourage improvement of
practice; rich professional development
of their own choosing; and increased
public understanding and support; the
teachers and administrators of the
Philadelphia schools will develop,
adopt, or adapt instructional
technologies and patterns of behavior
that will help all children reach the
District’s high standards.

ADDITIONAL
READING ON
CHILDREN
ACHIEVING
The following publications on the
evaluation of the Children Achieving
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are currently available through CPRE at
(215) 573-0700.
•

Recruiting and Retaining Teachers:
Keys to Improving the Philadelphia
Public Schools (May 2001)

•

School Leadership and Reform:
Case Studies of Philadelphia
Principals (May 2001)

•

Contradictions and Control in
Systemic Reform: The Ascendancy
of the Central Office in Philadelphia
Schools (August 2001)

•

Clients, Consumers, or
Collaborators? Parents and their
Roles in School Reform During
Children Achieving, 1995-2000
(August 2001)

DISCLAIMER
The research reported herein was
conducted by the Consortium for Policy
Research in Education and Research for
Action. Funding for this work was
provided by Greater Philadelphia First
and The Pew Charitable Trusts.
Opinions expressed in this report are
those of the author, and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Greater
Philadelphia First, The Pew Charitable
Trusts, or the institutional partners of
CPRE.
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CHILDREN
ACHIEVING
EVALUATION
1995-2001:
RESEARCH METHODS
During the past five years, the
Consortium for Policy Research in
Education and Research for Action used
the research methods indicated below
in their evaluation of the Children
Achieving Challenge.
1. 1996-2000 school-level data on
indicators that made up the
District’s Performance Responsibility
Index including student scores on
the SAT-9, student promotion and
graduation rates, student
attendance, and teacher
attendance.
2. Two census surveys of teachers, the
first in 1997 and the second in 1999.
Teachers were asked about reform
implementation, school conditions,
and teaching practices. There was a
greater than 60 percent response
rate on both surveys.
3. School indicators describing teacher
and student characteristics in 1996
and 1999 obtained from the School
District of Philadelphia’s Information
Services. These data included school
enrollment, number of teachers, the
proportion of students qualifying for
free or reduced price lunch, among
other indicators. These data were
used for descriptive purposes and in
hierarchical linear and logistic
regression models to help
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understand the relationships among
reform implementation, student
outcomes, and school
characteristics.
4. Five years (1995-1996 through 19992000) of qualitative research in 49
schools (26 elementary, 11 middle,
and 12 high schools) in 14 clusters.
Qualitative research included:
interviews of teachers, principals,
parents, outside partners who
worked in the schools, and in a few
cases, students; observations of
classrooms, SLC meetings,
professional development sessions,
and school leadership team
meetings; and review of school
documents (School Improvement
Plan, budget, etc.). Intensive, multiyear case study research in a subset
of 25 schools (13 elementary, 5
middle, and 7 high schools).
5. Interviews of central office and
cluster staff and observations of
meetings and other events.
6. Interviews of 40 Philadelphia civic
leaders (included political leaders,
leaders in the funding community,
public education advocates,
journalists, and business leaders).
In addition, numerous other studies
conducted during Children Achieving
informed this evaluation. These
included: Bruce Wilson and Dick
Corbett’s three-year interview study of
middle school students; an evaluation
of the Philadelphia Urban Systemic
Initiative in Mathematics and Science
conducted by Research for Action; the
Philadelphia Education Longitudinal
Study conducted by Frank Furstenberg
at the University of Pennsylvania; and
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the evaluation of the William Penn
Foundation’s initiative in two clusters
conducted by the National Center for
Restructuring Education, Schools, and
Teaching.
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INTRODUCTION:
THE ROLE OF THE
CENTRAL OFFICE IN
REFORM

T

he central administrators of
school districts have only rarely
been the focus of education
research. Still, the prevailing
attitude is that districts are either
irrelevant to or inhibitors of reform.
Studies of school-based reform efforts
often conclude that central office
policies impede innovation. The
proposals for school choice, charter
schools, vouchers, and contract schools
are a response, at least in part, to the
perceived ineffectiveness of school
districts. States and the federal
government, more and more, provide
funding directly to schools, rather than
via district central offices. And in 1994,
the Annenberg Foundation’s $500
million “Challenge” pledge, the largest
gift to urban public education ever
made, bypassed the school district’s
central offices as a mechanism of
reform in nearly every site where it
operated.
The School District of Philadelphia was
the one exception in the latter case.
Philadelphia’s Children Achieving,
funded through a $150 million
1
Annenberg Challenge grant, was a
sweeping “systemic reform” initiative.2

1

A relatively new theory of education
reform, systemic reform eschews a
school-by-school reform approach and
relies on the use of content and
performance standards,
decentralization, and accountability
mechanisms to transform entire school
systems. Led by central office
personnel, Children Achieving was
among the first attempts to put a
systemic reform theory to a test.
In this report, we examine the role of
the central office in this reform and
describe its evolution over the course
3
of Children Achieving. The first section
of the report recounts how conflicts
arose about the theory of systemic
reform, some of the Philadelphia
reformers’ underlying beliefs and
values, and the new roles envisioned for
the central office in the Children
Achieving reform plan. Central office
staff struggled with the competing
demands of accountability,
decentralization, and equity. What was
envisioned as a coherent and
interconnected set of strategies was
not always implemented or perceived in
that way. One result of the confusion
and inconsistencies in reform theory,
design, and implementation was a
gradual, but consistent, retreat from
content and performance standards, accountability
mechanisms, and decentralization. We use the term
“system-wide reform” to refer to reform across
entire districts, which is not necessarily “systemic
reform” (i.e., based on standards, accountability, and
decentralization, as defined above). We use the term
“standards-based” when we are discussing the
implications of content and performance standards in
particular.

1

Of the $150 million, $50 million was provided by
the Annenberg Foundation, and $100 million from
local matching contributions.
2

In this report, the term “systemic reform” is used
to connote an array of reform policies, including

3

Results of the reforms are reported in companion
documents that will be published in mid-2001. For
the most up-to-date information on these
publications, please contact CPRE at (215) 573-0700
or visit our web site: www.gse.upenn.edu/cpre/.

2

what initially was a key facet of the
plan: decentralization of authority from
the central office to schools.
The second part of the report examines
the capacity of the school district to
effectively support the reforms and
discusses the contextual issues that
affected implementation. We argue
that insufficient attention to the
knowledge, skills, and beliefs of
educators at all levels of the system as
well as the alienation of important
district partners, limited the human,
social, and fiscal capital available to the
district. This left the district without the
resources it needed to take on a reform
of the magnitude of Children
Achieving.
The Philadelphia story is neither one of
unbridled success nor irredeemable
failure. In addition to notable test score
improvements highlighted in other
CPRE reports, Philadelphia created
content standards in every subject,
benchmarks at important transition
grades, and curriculum frameworks for
every grade. The District also designed
and implemented complex
accountability measures for schools,
reorganized into clusters of schools and
small learning communities, provided
new learning opportunities for teachers,
and wrestled with the implementation
of systemic reform. But the hopes that
greeted this ambitious reform when it
began were never fulfilled. After David
Hornbeck resigned as Superintendent
in August 2000, Children Achieving was
all but dismantled. Our analysis
suggests that a combination of factors
contributed to the demise of Children
Achieving including: flaws in the theory
of action, flaws in implementation, lack
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of capacity and lack of attention to
building capacity, and inconsistency by
stakeholders about the beliefs and
values underlying the reform effort. The
final section of the report draws on the
experience of Philadelphia, both the
successes and the challenges, to
provide lessons for other districts taking
on systemic reform.

BACKGROUND TO
PHILADELPHIA’S CHILDREN
ACHIEVING REFORM
The ultimate goal of the Children
Achieving initiative was to do what “no
city with any significant number and
diversity of students” had ever done:
help “a large proportion of its young
4
people achieve at high levels.” To do
that, David Hornbeck, the
Superintendent who was the primary
architect of the reform effort, sought to
transform the entire District, from
schools to central office. Supported by
the Annenberg Challenge grant, he
argued that the District could raise
student achievement and improve
teaching and learning by implementing
standards and a strong accountability
system, empowering schools by moving
authority for instructional decisions
away from the central office, and
building capacity by providing a host of
supports for teachers and students.
Attaining the goal of improved student
achievement meant implementing
throughout the District — all at one
time — a complex set of reform
initiatives designed to work in concert.
4

School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving
strategic action design. Philadelphia: Author, 1995,
p. i.
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In our first report on the initiative, we
described Children Achieving’s theory
of action this way:
Given high academic standards and
strong incentives to focus their efforts
and resources; more control over
school resource allocations,
organization, policies, and programs;
adequate funding and resources; more
hands-on leadership and high-quality
support; better coordination of
resources and programs; schools
restructured to support good teaching
and encourage improvement of
practice; rich professional development
of their own choosing; and increased
public understanding and support; the
teachers and administrators of the
Philadelphia schools will develop, adopt
or adapt instructional technologies and
patterns of behavior that will help all
children reach the District’s high
5
standards.
Superintendent Hornbeck accepted this
description as an accurate statement of
his theory of action.6
The statement above also reflects, in
essence, the prevailing theory of
7
systemic reform. “Systemic reformers”
argue that previous attempts at reform
5

Consortium for Policy Research in Education,
Research for Action, and OMG Center for
Collaborative Learning, A first-year evaluation report
of Children Achieving: Philadelphia’s education
reform. Philadelphia: Greater Philadelphia First,
1996.
6

7

Field notes, September 1996.

J. Christman, T. Corcoran, E. Foley, and T. Luhm,
“Philadelphia’s Children Achieving initiative: The
promise and challenge of systemic reform in an
urban school district.” In W. Boyd (ed.), Reforming
urban school governance: Responses to the crisis of
performance. Westport, CT: Ablex/Greenwood
Publishing, in press.

3

have largely failed because they were
too incremental, too narrowly framed,
and did not attempt to alter the
“system” itself. They assert that
previous reforms did not institutionalize
high expectations for students and
teachers and did not fundamentally
alter the roles of those in charge of
governance and management
structures. They conclude that a more
comprehensive strategy that sets
academic standards, monitors
accountability, and coheres policy is
necessary.

BELIEFS AND VALUES
UNDERLYING THE REFORM
Philadelphia was among the first urban
school districts to take a systemic
approach to school reform and to test
this new theory of school improvement.
In addition to systemic theory, outlined
in a ten-point plan,8 Children Achieving
rested on a particular set of beliefs and
values. We found these values
articulated in District documents, in
speeches made by Superintendent
Hornbeck and other leaders, in
interviews with School District staff, and
in discussions at policy meetings. They
included:
Primacy of results. Results are what
matter; how they are achieved is less
important.
Equity is paramount. The School
District must be an advocate for the
poor children it serves. Equity — of
academic expectations, learning
8

For a detailed description of the Children Achieving
reform plan, please see our previous reports or
School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving
strategic action design.

4

opportunities and achievement
outcomes — is a paramount objective.
All children can learn, and “all” means
“all.”
School personnel need autonomy to
meet the needs of their students.
Those working closest to students know
what’s best for students, and want and
need the freedom and authority to act
on their decisions. Hence, central
authorities should not prescribe the
means to achieve the goals lest they
inhibit local innovation.
Strong incentives are necessary. To
9
spur action at the “cluster” and school
level, strong incentives must be
developed. Incentives might include
rewards and sanctions for performance
as well as rewards and sanctions for
adopting particular strategies or
behaviors.
Do it all at once. Reform in all aspects
of the system must occur
simultaneously and immediately to
achieve significant results.
These beliefs and values were not
equally important nor consistently
apparent over the course of the reform.
Depending on the central office figure
leading the effort, the year, or the goal
of the initiative, one core belief might
be emphasized over another.
Sometimes seemingly conflicting beliefs
co-existed. We will return to these
beliefs and values throughout this
9

Clusters were created under Children Achieving
and are the District’s intermediary organizational unit
between the central office and the schools. Under
Children Achieving there were 22 clusters in
Philadelphia, each organized around a
comprehensive high school and the elementary and
middle schools that feed into it.
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report, demonstrating how they shaped
central office policy and reform
implementation, the relationship
between schools, clusters, and the
central office, and the roles of central
office leaders.
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POLICY EVOLUTIONS

W

hen David Hornbeck
began his job as
Superintendent in
Philadelphia, he promised
to turn the School District “on its
head.”10 No longer would the central
office dictate to schools. “Those who sit
closest to the action are in the best
position to decide what mix of
resources…will most effectively
accomplish the goal of raising student
achievement.”11 Schools would be given
12
what Hill, Harvey, and Campbell call
“freedom of action” through greater
control over their own resources and
the ability to make the decisions that
would most directly impact students. As
noted above, the “commitment to
substantial school level autonomy” was
a central tenet of Children Achieving.13
Exactly what this fundamental change
in organization meant for the role of the
central office was unclear from the
beginning. The blueprint for the
Children Achieving initiative, the
Strategic Action Design, stated that the
new functions of the central office were
to “set standards, assess progress,
monitor for equity, and act as a guide
and provider of resources and
14
support.” But in practice these
10

School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving
strategic action design, p. iv.

11

Ibid, p. III-11.

12

P. Hill, J. Harvey, and C. Campbell, It takes a city.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000,
p. 49.

13

School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving
strategic action design, p. III-10

14

Ibid, p. iv.

5

changes were complex and difficult to
achieve, as central office staff tried to
negotiate their work amid the new
ideas, structures, and policies that
made up Children Achieving and the
sometimes-conflicting roles these
functions suggested for them.

SETTING STANDARDS:
CENTRALIZED
DECENTRALIZATION
One of the first major activities of the
central office staff was to create “worldclass” content standards for
English/language arts, mathematics,
science, and the arts. After an eightmonth drafting process involving
Philadelphia teachers, principals, and
community members, the content
standards were circulated for
widespread review beginning in August
1996. Content standards for social
studies, health and physical education,
and world languages followed in May
1997. The standards described
generally what skills and knowledge
students should acquire in each subject
and should be able to demonstrate by
the end of three benchmark grades:
fourth, eighth, and eleventh.
The development of content standards
was a departure for a school district
that had relied on a Standardized
Curriculum for most of the previous
decade. Implemented during the
administration of Hornbeck’s
predecessor, Constance Clayton, the
Standardized Curriculum specifically
delineated what should be taught in
every grade, as well as when it should
be taught, including a daily pacing
schedule. Critics of the Standardized

6

Curriculum suggested that it mired
teachers in traditional ways of teaching
and de-professionalized the vocation of
teaching. Sometimes curricula of this
type are described as “teacher-proof”
because they are intended to limit the
ability of individual teachers to
determine what is taught. In
Philadelphia, there was not widespread
resistance to the Standardized
Curriculum; on the contrary, many
teachers were comfortable with it. But
since there was no system for
monitoring its implementation, we do
not know how extensively it was
followed.
Though standards setting was viewed
as a centralized function, the move
from the Standardized Curriculum to a
system of content standards was in
practice a de facto form of
decentralization. Under the previous
administration, the Standardized
Curriculum identified both the goals for
student learning and the means of
getting there. The intent of standards,
on the other hand, was to define the
goals for schools, while allowing them
to choose the means to reach them.
Although setting the standards was a
centralized function, leaving the
curriculum to be defined at the school
level was consistent with the central
belief in the need for increased school
autonomy.
This was the theory expressed in early
interviews with central office staff. They
said over and over again how important
it was to get “decisions down to the
schools.” They emphasized the role of
school staff in making decisions about
how best to serve students. “We are
not going to mandate how schools are
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to improve,” one central office leader
noted. Another said, “Among the
enlightened practitioners there is a
sense that a lot of the solutions are at
the local level. They [schools] should be
creative, make decisions about budget,
15
curriculum choice…” The idea was
that the central office would set the
standards, and schools would figure out
how to help students achieve them.
Initially, some central office staffers
interpreted the goal of decentralization
so literally that almost every action
proposed by the central office was a
topic of contention. For example,
during an October 1996 policy
meeting, central office staff and other
influential policy leaders debated
whether or not efforts should be made
to improve the capacity of the central
office to offer curriculum expertise to
strengthen teachers’ understanding and
use of the standards. A meeting
participant described the dilemma:
There is only one pot of money. And so
if you use it to develop the skills of
central office staff then you are basically
saying to the schools, ‘You don’t have
to use it [central office expertise], but
16
we took your resources to develop it.’
But, not all central office leaders were
hesitant to take on capacity-building
roles. Other meeting participants
argued that it was absolutely necessary
for the central office to help schools
make decisions. One noted, “Schools
need a bridge to the new standards
and expectations.” Another said, “Local
schools should be able to come to the
15

Field Notes, April 28, 1998.

16

Field Notes, October 30, 1996.
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central office for the expertise to
implement the Children Achieving
reforms.” Some supported their
position by giving examples of poor
decisions made by schools when given
authority without guidance. “We waste
millions of dollars every year on
decentralized textbook purchases. They
[the materials schools select] are not
17
standards-based.”
These debates about the central office
role in curriculum policy continued over
the next several months. To some
central office leaders, everything
seemed up for grabs. A good part of
one early policy meeting was devoted
to a discussion of the implications of
the standards’ rhetoric that suggests
that student outcomes should not vary,
rather the amount of time allotted for
students to reach the standards should
vary, that is, “time is the variable.” In
that meeting, policy leaders grappled
with such basic issues as whether
students should be assigned to grades
(e.g., first grade, second grade, third
grade, and so on), whether students
should be assessed with letter grades
(e.g., A, B, C, etc.) at all, and whether
any student should be allowed to “fail.”
One of them said, “If time is truly the
variable, a zero doesn’t count anymore.
It would just be a student taking longer
to get where they should be according
to the standards.”18 Another said that
standards implied a completely
ungraded system through which
students could move at their own pace.
Two members of the Superintendent’s
inner circle were leading this meeting,

7

and resisted the conclusion that schools
would have to be ungraded and
completely eliminate failure. “Take a
step back,” one of them suggested, “Is
this central’s decision? If we have
standards, assessment, and
accountability, then couldn’t we have it
different in different schools?”19
These tensions concerning the roles of
schools in making decisions and the
role of the central office as a source of
guidance were apparent throughout
many early discussions. There were
debates about whether to develop a
core group of consultants for the
20
central office, whether to organize the
21
content standards by grade level,
whether to create a district list of
standards-based materials for reading
and math,22 whether to provide
professional development for testing of
culturally and linguistically diverse
students,23 and whether to fund New
Standards and portfolio pilot
programs.24 In each of these cases, at
least one central office staff member
expressed confusion about how they
could faithfully implement Children
Achieving without impinging on
schools’ autonomy to make their own
decisions.
Some of this confusion can be
attributed to the central office’s limited
capacity to serve as leaders of an
19

Field notes, December 12, 1996.

20

Field notes, October 30, 1996.

21

Field notes, December 11, 1996.

22

Field notes, March 13, 1997.

17

Field notes, October 30, 1996.

23

Field notes, March 13, 1997.

18

Field notes, December 12, 1996.

24

Field notes, April 17, 1997.
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emerging Philadelphia standards
movement, a subject we address in
more detail later in this report. But it
also reflected a lack of clarity about the
role of the central office in the reform.
Children Achieving stated that the
central office would make fewer
decisions for schools, but that it would
act as a “guide and provider of
resources and support” — what we call
capacity-building. They struggled to
figure out how to be both more
“hands-off” and more helpful to
schools. Several central office leaders
felt the capacity-building role conflicted
with the core value of school autonomy.
They wondered if the central office
should play any role in capacitybuilding, considering the commitment
to decentralization and the substantial
investment made in clusters, an
intermediate organizational unit
between the central office and the
schools. Other reform leaders, who
believed schools would not be able to
reform themselves alone, felt that the
central office had to play a role in
building capacity. There was no
consensus, however, about what kind of
support and direction that role implied.

NEW AUTONOMY PERCEIVED
AS MANDATES BY SCHOOLS
Figuring out the central office’s new
role was also difficult because the
capacity of schools varied. Full
decentralization assumes that schools
have the know-how and the resources
to improve student achievement, but
simply lack the opportunity or authority
to make the decisions that matter. But,
in Philadelphia, this was not always the
case, as we observed in an earlier
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report.25 As the central office in
Philadelphia tried to relinquish control,
some school staff experienced their
new authority as burdensome. With
limited resources and little support, the
new responsibilities could be frustrating
for school staff. As one teacher told us,
When it comes to implementing the
[Children Achieving reform], how can
we [implement it] if we have to come
up with it on our own? There are too
many top-down commands and not
enough attention to how the orders
would be carried out. They come in and
say, ‘This is what we want. Do it.’ But
they don’t give you time to learn it or
implement it. I wish there was [sic] more
26
support from the administration.
This quote belies the core belief in the
need for school autonomy. Few schools
and teachers were eager to wrest
control over all decision-making and
policy from the central office. And even
those who were so inclined emphasized
how little time they had to devote to
the considerable and important tasks of
curriculum development and school
restructuring.
The quote above also points to one of
the ironies of Children Achieving. Most
of the policies that were implemented
as part of Children Achieving, especially
in the early years of reform, were
intended to give schools more
autonomy. But, to school personnel
these efforts seemed more invasive
25

J. Christman, Guidance for school improvement in
a decentralizing system: How much, what kind, and
from where? Philadelphia: Consortium for Policy
Research in Education, Research for Action, and
OMG Center for Collaborative Learning, 1998.
26

Teacher, Spring 1997.
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than the more prescriptive, albeit,
familiar approaches, such as the
Standardized Curriculum. Because the
decision to decentralize was made
centrally, and designed with little
consultation with the field, school and
cluster personnel experienced
“decentralization” as a set of central
mandates. For example, we heard
regular complaints about the undue
burden of creating and certifying local
school councils, an aspect of the reform
that was intended to provide teachers
and parents more authority over their
schools. The development of small
learning communities, which served
numerous purposes including further
decentralization, was also criticized by
some school staff as demanding too
much of their time and energy.
The creation of clusters — groups of
schools made up of a comprehensive
high school and its feeder middle and
elementary schools — also contributed
to the perception of creating mandates.
Twenty-two cluster offices were
established in Philadelphia, and were
expected to mobilize resources, and
provide guidance, focus, and
professional development. While the
central office may have thought of
clusters as a form of decentralization,
school personnel did not experience
them that way. The central office
funneled all communication through the
clusters and expected the rollout of
reforms to be supported primarily by
cluster staff. To schools, clusters were
simply another layer of bureaucracy
that decreased rather than increased
school autonomy.27
27

For a full discussion of school personnel’s reactions
to clusters, please see a companion document that
will be published in mid-2001. For the most up-todate information on this publication, please contact
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THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL
PARTNERS AND WORK TEAMS
School staff were critical of the content
standards, saying that the standards
and the accompanying Standards
Curriculum Resource Guide28 did not
provide them with enough guidance
about what to teach. Many pined for
the clarity of the Standardized
Curriculum.29 Though several central
policymakers, to their credit,
recognized this need early in the
initiative, there was no consensus about
how much guidance to provide or how
to provide it.
Two of the School District’s primary
external partners, the Children
Achieving Challenge and the
Philadelphia Education Fund, played
significant roles in persuading the
central office to accept a capacitybuilding role. Leaders from both groups
were members of the Executive
Committee and the Superintendent’s
Cabinet. They also played primary roles
in establishing and leading the seven
work teams charged with developing
goals, setting priorities, and creating
CPRE at (215) 573-0700 or visit our web site:
www.gse.upenn.edu/cpre/.
28

Published soon after the Content Standards were
sent out for review, the Standards Curriculum
Resource Guides were intended to take the place of
the Instructional Planning Guides and Marking
Guidelines which teachers had become used to in
the Standardized Curriculum. But there was much
dissatisfaction with the replacement guides, and
many questioned their alignment with the standards
(Field notes, December 1996).
29

For a full discussion of teachers’ initial reaction to
the release of the content standards, see E. Simon, E.
Foley, and C. Passantino, Making sense of standards.
Philadelphia: Consortium for Policy Research in
Education, University of Pennsylvania, 1998.
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annual workplans to implement
Children Achieving.
In the early stages of the reform effort,
many important policy discussions took
place in meetings of work teams and
work team leaders. During those
discussions, external partners pushed
central office staff to recognize the
need for building capacity in schools
and clusters. In an illustrative exchange
during one policy meeting, a member
of an external partner group challenged
a central office leader to think in more
complex ways about what it would take
to move to a decentralized, standardsbased system. They were debating
whether to create lists of standardsbased materials in reading and math to
guide schools in the purchase of
textbooks and other curriculum
resources. One central office leader felt
that the central office simply needed to
tell the schools to select materials that
were “standards-driven” and then let
the schools figure out how to do that.
She reflected the core belief in school
autonomy when she said that what the
central office really needed to do was
send a memo from the Superintendent
saying that any materials schools select
need to be “standards-driven.” She
asserted that the central office needs to
“release the control” and that “schools
need to get responsible.” She
wondered, “why bring this
[responsibility] back to the central
office?”
An external partner disagreed with the
central office leader voicing this
opinion. The partner felt that at some
point schools might be able to take
more responsibility for selecting
standards-driven materials, but school
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staff needed to learn how to be “good
consumers” first. It was the central
office’s responsibility, therefore, to
provide schools with guidance and
support until the time when schools had
developed the capacity to do it on their
own. The external partner described
this as “trying to deal with the vacuum
in between.”30
Central policymakers found it difficult
to navigate the “vacuum” that lay
between a fully centralized and a fully
decentralized system. To some, a
District-led effort to build capacity
seemed to be in conflict with the value
of school autonomy. If schools were to
assume control over their own
destinies, could the central office set
parameters or legitimately mandate
specific actions? What supports could
the central office feasibly supply? How
strong should signals be about what
and how to teach?

GUIDANCE THROUGH
STANDARDS
By the end of the 1996-1997 school
year, District policy leaders were trying
to specify which policies would be
mandated centrally and which would be
left to the schools and clusters to
decide. For example, in a curriculum
policy meeting held with the
Superintendent, administrators
developed a summary statement about
the role of the central office. The first
two points clarified the central office’s
role in “standards-driven policy
development.”

30

Field Notes, March 3, 1997.
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We will mandate standards, graduation
requirements, assessments, promotion
policy, some reporting elements, [and
some] aspects of student responsibility.

role initially envisioned in Children
Achieving. By setting standards of
practice for various School District
activities, the central office could signal
what they believed were the most
promising approaches without, they
felt, impinging on schools’ right to
prescribe their own “treatment.” Over
the next two years, central office
personnel created standards of practice
for many central, cluster, and school
activities, including: classroom practice,
testing, professional development,
early literacy, culturally and linguistically
diverse students’ graduation and
promotion requirements, school
rosters, budgets, small learning
communities, central office practice,
equity, cluster practice, and the
33
Comprehensive Support Process.

Issues of curriculum and instruction
(graded vs. non[-graded], core
curriculum, intensive scheduling, etc.)
will be treated as issues of best
practice. This means providing
information as to degrees of flexibility,
recommending research-based
practices, [and] developing curriculum
31
as resources — but not mandating.
The first statement spelled out that the
central office would set standards not
only for content, but also for
performance (e.g., graduation,
promotion). The second statement
implied a role for the central office as a
gentle guide in all other aspects of
curriculum policy. Still trying to remain
true to the reform’s underlying belief
that “schools need autonomy,” the
central office would “provide
information,” and “recommend” best
practices, but not mandate their use.
Signals about curriculum from the
central office would be suggestions, not
policy. The goal was, as one central
office leader noted, to “err on the least
amount of policy” or mandates, without
looking “uncaring or unaware” of the
realities and needs of schools.32
One of the results of this approach was
that the central office engaged in a
flurry of standards development,
consistent with the standards-setting
31

School District of Philadelphia, Standards-driven
policy development. Philadelphia: Author,
unpublished manuscript, 1997.
32

Field notes, April 24, 1997.

It is beyond the scope of this evaluation
to assess the effect of each of these
sets of standards or to reach
conclusions about whether their impact
was positive or negative. It is clear,
however, that the strategy of
developing guidelines for, rather than
mandating, practice was used
extensively by central office leaders in
their effort to navigate the new roles
laid out for them in Children Achieving.
However, these standards were often
perceived by the field as mandates, in
part because the standards were often
used to evaluate school performance
(e.g., in the development of small
learning communities). Schools
continued to see standards as
requirements handed down from
above, rather than as opportunities for
increased school autonomy.
33

This is not necessarily an exhaustive list. These are
just the sets of standards of which the evaluation
team was aware.
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TRYING TO FILL THE VACUUM:
CURRICULUM FRAMEWORKS

they are and where we want them to
be.34

The process of defining the role of the
central office in curriculum policy also
led to the publication of more detailed,
standards-based curriculum supports.
The District began to discuss
development of curriculum frameworks
as early as December 1996, but it was
not until after questions about
“standards-driven policy development”
were resolved that work on the
frameworks began in earnest. School
and cluster staff also helped central
office leaders to recognize the need for
more detailed curriculum supports.
Responses from teachers and schools
reflected a desire for more specific
direction than the content standards
and the accompanying “Standards
Curriculum Resources” guides and
helped persuade the central office to
shift their priority from giving schools
more freedom of action to offering
more guidance and resources. The
“Curriculum Frameworks,” which
debuted in January 1998, were created,
in part, because teachers asked for
them. One of the leaders in this work
explained:

Though he noted that at first he felt the
Curriculum Frameworks were
antithetical to “what standards-driven
instruction is about,” he and other
central office staff altered their stance
because there was “a reality gap.”
Rather than leaving it up to teachers,
schools, and clusters to develop
standards-based curricula and teaching
methods by themselves, he came to the
realization that “we need to build the
capacity in schools, among teachers.”35
The Curriculum Frameworks were
intended to be just the first step in that
regard, though in reality they turned
out to be the only published curricular
resources offered to all teachers.

I’ve never before worked on a
document that teachers asked for with
the exception of [the Curriculum
Frameworks]. Not in 13 years with the
District. Teachers wanted the support.
The TLN [Teaching and Learning
Network, based in the clusters]
persuaded the central office staff it was
needed. We were persuaded to do it.
They needed a bridge between where

The Curriculum Frameworks refrained
from mandating a specific curriculum,
but they did identify constructivism as
the pedagogical philosophy underlying
the District standards. Constructivism
emphasizes the student’s active
engagement in his or her own learning
and advocates hands-on instructional
approaches. In the overview of the

The Curriculum Frameworks were
designed to answer the question,
“What do I need to do to get my
students to achieve these standards?”
They fleshed out the academic content
standards and were organized by
grade, defined grade-specific skills and
content, and offered suggestions for
units and activities that addressed the
content standards.

34

Field notes, April 27, 1998.

35

Field notes, April 27, 1998.
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Curriculum Frameworks, its authors
advocated constructivist practices.36

RESPONSE TO THE
CURRICULUM FRAMEWORKS

[Earlier curriculum materials] stress skill
development through practice, drill,
and memorization; the standards stress
constructivist learning by understanding
and applying knowledge…The ways of
teaching and learning reflected in the
earlier documents are not appropriate
for preparing all students to meet the
high standards set forth in the
37
Philadelphia standards.

The Curriculum Frameworks were well
received by teachers, especially those
at the elementary and middle school
levels. More than 46 percent of
teachers who responded to a teacher
survey conducted by CPRE in 1999 felt
that the Curriculum Frameworks had
helped them change their teaching
methods. Still many complained that
the guidance offered through the
Curriculum Frameworks was not
enough. Over half of teachers agreed
“somewhat” or “strongly” with the
statement that the frameworks were
“too vague about the content to be
covered to be helpful with my lesson
planning.” Leaders of the Philadelphia
Federation of Teachers (PFT)
complained repeatedly that the
Curriculum Frameworks did not offer
new teachers enough guidance about
what to teach, an omission that a PFT
representative claimed was contributing
to Philadelphia’s high teacher attrition
rate.38

The publication of the Curriculum
Frameworks marked the first instance
during the Children Achieving reform
era when the central office had stated
that the Philadelphia standards implied
a specific approach to instruction. Until
then, the rhetoric from the central
office had been that any instructional
approach that worked to help students
meet the standards was acceptable and
appropriate, consistent with the core
belief that results, not means, were
what mattered. By asserting the
desirability of the constructivist
approach, the central office made a
clear departure from this core belief.

36

It is important to note that standards are not
inherently constructivist, though some advocates of
standards advocate this pedagogical approach.
Standards could just as easily be linked to more
traditional pedagogy.
37

School District of Philadelphia, Curriculum
frameworks. Philadelphia: Author, 1998, p. 2. A later,
revised version of the Curriculum Frameworks stated
the connection between standards and
constructivism more strongly: “One of the major
theories about teaching and learning on which the
standards movement in Philadelphia and elsewhere
has been based is constructivism” (School District of
Philadelphia web site,
http://www.philasch.k12.pa.us/offices/curriculum/fra
meworks/standriv/index.htm).

The Curriculum Frameworks advocated
a radically different approach to
instruction than was the norm in the
School District of Philadelphia. The
pedagogical approach advocated in the
frameworks, constructivism, was neither
widely practiced nor widely understood
by the city’s teachers. As illustrated in
39
an earlier CPRE report, prior to
publication of the Curriculum
Frameworks, teachers had only a
superficial understanding of the
38

39

Field notes, June 5, 2000.

Simon, Foley, and Passantino, Making sense of
standards.
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implications of content standards for
their practice. Typically, they used the
standards as checklists, to check off the
topics covered. They saw the standards
as having relevance for the content of
their courses, but not for their teaching
practice or for student performance.
This was not surprising given how little
opportunity teachers had been given to
discuss the standards and how little
support they received with curricular
reviews.
Two years after the standards were
adopted, with the publication of the
Curriculum Frameworks and more time
to absorb what the standards implied
for their practice, we found that more
teachers were moving toward
standards-based instruction. However,
the typical teacher’s practice was still
far from the kind of teaching described
in the introduction to the Curriculum
Frameworks. In an intensive study of
classrooms in 1997-1998, we found that
most lessons lacked intellectual rigor,
and content difficulty and expectations
for students were both low. Some
teachers continued to ignore the
standards and curriculum frameworks,
especially high school teachers. As the
central office staff began to understand
just how much instruction had to
change, they began to consider
stronger signals to induce reform.
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functions were combined in the
Professional Responsibility Index, the
District’s primary accountability
mechanism, which included measures
of both student achievement and
equity. Equity and accountability
concerns were also addressed through
the graduation and promotion supports
and requirements and the citywide
proficiency exams.40
In the following section we describe
how the central office’s interpretation
of these two roles led it to develop
stronger and more prescriptive signals
to schools about what and how to
teach. We also show how equity
concerns naturally led to an emphasis
on education inputs — such as
resources, course content, and teaching
quality — that conflicted with the core
value that “results are what matter.”
Finally, we reveal what we believe to be
a contradiction inherent in the design
of Children Achieving and in the theory
of systemic reform in general: Wellaligned accountability and assessment
systems presume a uniform curriculum.
Therefore teachers and schools cannot
determine their curriculum
autonomously. Systemic reform
promises both alignment and
autonomy, without acknowledging the
trade-offs between the two.

SEND STRONGER SIGNALS
TO ENSURE EQUITY
In addition to capacity-building and
setting standards, Children Achieving
defined two other roles for the central
office: monitoring equity and holding
School District staff accountable for
student achievement. These two

40

The Comprehensive Support Process (CSP) was
also a major equity initiative. For a full explanation of
the CSP, please see E. Foley, Restructuring student
support services: Redefining the role of the school
district. Philadelphia: Consortium for Policy Research
in Education, University of Pennsylvania, 1998.

Contradictions and Control in Systemic Reform

A NOBLE PREOCCUPATION
WITH EQUITY
One of the core beliefs underlying the
Children Achieving reforms was an
emphasis on equity, exemplified by the
statement we heard over and over
again from the Superintendent and
other central office leaders: “All
children can learn at high levels, and
‘all’ means ‘all.’”41 The blueprint for the
reform asserted that every child would
benefit from Children Achieving
“including those from low-income
families, racial and language minorities,
students with disabilities, and other
populations we have historically
failed.”42 There was consistent attention
to equity issues in policy meetings, and
all new policies were considered in
terms of their potential effects on
equity. “Everything can be equity,” one
policy leader told us.43 Central office
staff took a suspicious view of policies
adopted by the Philadelphia Board of
Education that were perceived as
exclusive, such as the reinstitution of
admission requirements in some small
learning communities and the creation
of elite magnet programs, and they
44
were reluctant to implement them.
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If there is a legacy, it will be that all kids
are included and that we should have a
stake in having all children achieve.
That is the real contribution David
[Hornbeck] has made…45
With the passionate support of the
Superintendent himself, the primacy of
this core belief never wavered
throughout the reform effort and only
grew in importance among central
office leaders as the reform progressed.

THE LINK BETWEEN EQUITY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Monitoring equity and enforcing
accountability were highly linked in
Children Achieving. A key strategy for
encouraging school personnel to make
the commitment to equity was to
develop and implement an
accountability policy that would compel
schools to pay attention to the
achievement of every student. The
Professional Responsibility Index, or
PRI, was an annual score for every
school in the system based on several
indicators of performance:
•

Student scores on standardized
tests of reading, mathematics, and
science (Stanford-9 Achievement
Test);

•

Either the promotion rate (in
elementary and middle schools) or
the persistence-to-graduation rate
(in secondary schools); and

•

Teacher and student attendance
rates.

Many central office staff members felt
that this focus on equity was the
hallmark of the reform.

41

For example, field notes, February 19, 1998 and
April 1, 1999.
42

School District of Philadelphia, Children Achieving
strategic action design, p. I-1.
43

Field notes, July 3, 1997.
45

44

Field notes, April 1, 1998 and May 14, 1998.

Field notes, November 1999.
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Every two years, schools were rewarded
or sanctioned based on their progress
on two accountability goals: (1) meeting
or surpassing their PRI growth target
and (2) decreasing the average
proportion of students scoring at the
lowest levels on the three portions of
the SAT-9. The latter provision was
included to prevent schools from
“creaming,” that is, only testing their
brightest students, and to induce
schools to treat all students as having
the potential to perform at high levels
on the SAT-9. Additionally, an element
of the first goal, the growth target, also
was intended to promote more equal
treatment of students. Schools were
awarded points toward their growth
target simply for testing students,
regardless of the students’ actual
scores on the test. In the first
accountability cycle, some high schools’
average achievement actually
decreased, but they were able to reach
their growth target by including more
students in the testing program.
Rewarding schools for testing students
had a major impact on inclusion in
testing. The proportion of special
education and culturally and
linguistically diverse students tested
increased significantly in the first
46
accountability cycle. While overall
achievement improved annually, data
disaggregated by race/ethnicity, family
income, gender, English language
proficiency, and disability showed large
gaps, some of which grew over the
course of Children Achieving.47 Central
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office staff reacted emotionally to data
that showed certain groups of students
falling behind their peers. For example,
in 1998, the four-year graduation rate
was almost 30 points lower for students
in families on welfare (39.9 percent)
than for all other students (67.2
percent). The four-year graduation rate
for Latino students overall was only
48
37.1 percent. Fifteen percent fewer
eleventh grade African American boys
scored at or above basic in reading in
1998 (18.8 percent) than their female,
African American counterparts (33.8
percent). More than half of White
students (54 percent), on the other
hand, scored at or above basic on the
reading test that year.49
Examining these results in a policy
meeting, one central office leader
described herself as “heartsick.”50
Another summarized: “Areas of deep
concern are for low-income students, as
well as Latino and African American
students, especially those who are male
and especially at higher levels of
schooling.”51
In order to hold schools accountable for
results, the School District needed to
measure results, but measurement
spotlighted the alarming inequity of
outcomes across the District. This noble
preoccupation with equitable outcomes
naturally led central office leaders to
question the equity of inputs, even
though as one high-level staff member
put it, “focuses on inputs are not in
48

Ibid, p. 8.

D. Hornbeck and G. Ingram, Policy 102 progress
and plans: December 15, 1998. Philadelphia: School
District of Philadelphia, 1998.

49

Ibid, p. 11.

50

Field notes, April 1, 1999.

47

51

Ibid.

46

Ibid.
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sync with a standards-driven system.”52
“Focusing on inputs,” that is
determining which student populations
were receiving which resources and
supports, conflicted with the core value,
expressed in the blueprint for the
Children Achieving reform, that results
are what matter. “Input” issues that
arose over the course of the reform
included: the differences in per-pupil
funding between Philadelphia and its
surrounding districts, the quality of
teaching, the lack of uniformity in
course content, the effects of
uncertified teachers on student
achievement, student access to elite
small learning communities and magnet
programs, and the distribution of
programs for gifted and talented
students, among others. The low
achievement of English language
learners and minority, low-income, and
disabled students, and the slow pace of
change, also served as pressures on
central office leaders to develop
stronger signals to schools about what
and how to teach.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
OPPORTUNITY-TO-LEARN AND
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
The connection between equity and
accountability was also apparent as
central office staff began to think about
ways to address student accountability
for achievement. District leaders saw a
strong connection between students’
accountability for their academic
performance and the “inputs”
discussed above, which were termed
“fair opportunities to learn.” While they
lamented some school staff members’
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low expectations of students,
particularly of students in historically
underserved groups, they also
recognized a need to encourage
students to make efforts to achieve at
high levels. A central office leader told
us, “Now that school-level
accountability has been instituted, we
have to balance that with student-level
53
accountability.”
When the PRI was first implemented,
schools became accountable for
student achievement, but there was no
district policy incentive to encourage
students to do their best on the tests,
to work hard in school, or to take their
own education seriously. However,
neither the central office staff nor the
Board of Education members felt that
implementation of student
accountability was possible without a
concerted effort to provide students
with the necessary supports for success.
Without these supports — high-quality
instruction, opportunities for
remediation, access to summer school,
and rich learning resources — students
could not be justifiably held to
performance standards in their view.
The graduation and promotion
supports and requirements along with
the citywide proficiency examinations
were expected to be the School
District’s primary methods for finding
that balance. Opportunity-to-Learn
standards were envisioned in the initial
blueprint for the Children Achieving
reform but were never fully developed.
The Graduation and Promotion
Supports and Requirements, adopted
in June 1998, did articulate some of the
53

52

Field notes, February 18, 1998.

Field notes, November 1999.
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supports to which students were
entitled, and one District leader
consistently referred to these as “one
kind of opportunity-to-learn
standards.”54
The Graduation and Promotion
Supports and Requirements were
scheduled to take effect beginning in
the 1999-2000 school year.55 This
ambitious and extensive set of policies
included descriptions of the
“interlocking commitment needed from
key parties to ensure that all children
have the opportunity to learn,” the
“instructional supports necessary to
raise achievement levels,” and the new
requirements for admission to grades 5
and 9 and for graduation. The Board
adopted the new policies on the
condition that the graduation and
promotion requirements, such as
passing all major courses, would be
enforced only if the supports were
available, such as increased
instructional time for at-risk students.

CITYWIDE PROFICIENCY
EXAMS
Included in the graduation and
promotion requirements was a
provision for developing citywide
proficiency exams for grades 7 through
12 in all major subjects. To be
promoted from eighth grade and to
graduate, the new policies required
that students pass all their major
courses, as well as the SAT-9 or the
proficiency exam. Additionally, scores
54

55

Field notes, May 14, 1998 and December 3, 1998.

Due to funding limitations, only the requirements
for entrance to fifth grade were enforced in June
2000.
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on the proficiency tests would be
calculated into the final grade of all
students in grades 7-12. By spring
2000, proficiency exams had been
developed and piloted in English I and
II, algebra I and II, geometry, integrated
math I, living environment I, and
physical science I and II. Development
of assessments in social studies, as well
as in all subjects in other grades, would
be developed over the next several
years, but their future is in doubt under
the post-Hornbeck administration.
Central office leaders greatly
anticipated the development and
implementation of the proficiency
exams. Less than a year after the
development of the Curriculum
Frameworks, they looked to the
proficiency exams to provide stronger
incentives to signal to teachers what,
and how, to teach. Increasingly less
concerned with the need to give school
personnel freedom to make curricular
decisions, central office leaders
developed these more prescriptive
approaches in the name of equity.
Again, this highlighted a conflict
between two of the reform’s core
values: the need for strong incentives
and the emphasis on school autonomy.
And again, school autonomy lost.
During one policy meeting where
central office leaders discussed the
need to increase the rigor and similarity
of course content across the District,
one individual explained to the group
how the proficiency exams would take
precedence over the Curriculum
Frameworks in identifying curriculum
content for teachers. “[The citywide]
finals will determine what’s in the
Algebra courses. And what’s in the
other subjects will be determined by
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the finals as well.”56 In an interview in
December 1998, a central office leader
described the citywide finals as, “the
tail that wags the dog. When we
publish the scope and sequence, they
[teachers] will finally know what they
have to teach…” During the meetings
we observed, there was no discussion
about the influence of the tests on
pedagogy. It seemed to be assumed
that the tests would drive the kind of
instruction — constructivism — that
district leaders supported. It is
important to note that proficiency
exams were for middle schools and
high schools only, the two school levels
at which Children Achieving had the
57
least success.
Central office leaders believed that the
addition of penalties and rewards for
student performance on the proficiency
exams would make them harder for
teachers to ignore.58 Developed in
collaboration with the American
Institutes for Research, the proficiency
exams were based on the Curriculum
Frameworks, but more detailed than
the frameworks. The specifications
weren’t available until October 1999,
but by that time, central policymakers
seemed to have accepted the premise
that these new examinations would
56

Field notes, December 3, 1998.
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For a description of the impact of reform on
schools, please see a companion document that will
be published in mid-2001. For the most up-to-date
information on this publication, please contact CPRE
at (215) 573-0700 or visit our web site:
www.gse.upenn.edu/cpre/.
58

Due primarily to logistical problems and funding
uncertainties, the citywide finals were not used as
part of the School District’s graduation and
promotion requirements. That is, finals were not
calculated into a student’s grade or used for
promotion or graduation decisions.
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serve as incentives for teachers, clearly
signaling to them what to teach. This
exchange between a CPRE interviewer
and a School District leader illustrates
the point:
CPRE:

In the ideal, what should
teachers consider when they
decide what to teach?

SDP:

In the ideal? [They should
consider] the standards and
we have benchmarks at
grades 4, 8, and 11. They
should refer to our
frameworks and our content
standards.

CPRE:

What incentives exist for
them to do that?

SDP:

The development of the
proficiency exams. The exams
are built around the
frameworks. They need to
use those resources if they
want their kids to do well on
the exams. The work comes
directly from the frameworks.
This year will set the tone…
We have the test specs that
come from the Curriculum
Frameworks. The proficiency
exams will come from the test
specs. And teachers will
figure out the things that they
are not covering, that they
are not teaching. Also,
people will figure out you
can’t offer sports math and
do well on an algebra exam;
so it will [end up] redesigning
courses of study.
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CPRE:

So you really see these exams
as a driver of instruction?

SDP:

We’re designing them that
way.59

With this prescriptive approach — using
the proficiency exams to delineate
course content and instruction — the
central office made a dramatic shift
from the early emphasis on school
autonomy. This shift, however, was
consistent with the pressures, and
perhaps the flaws, of systemic reform.
A well-aligned accountability and
assessment system demands a uniform
curriculum and the development of
proficiency exams was simply another
step in that direction. The exams were
clearly intended to drive instruction,
making any assertion false that said
schools could determine the means to
get results for which they were being
held accountable.

EXPLAINING THE SHIFT
AWAY FROM SCHOOL
AUTONOMY
The shift in the central office role from a
focus on decentralization to more
prescriptive approaches was partly a
result of frustration with the slow pace
of change. Senge, Cambron-McCabe,
Lucas, Smith, Dutton, and Kleiner60
identify an emphasis on top-down
mandates as a common (but ineffective)
59

60
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P. Senge, N. Cambron-McCabe, T. Lucas, B. Smith,
J. Dutton, and A. Kleiner, Schools that learn: A fifth
discipline fieldbook for educators, parents, and
everyone who cares about public education. New
York: Doubleday, 2000.

response to low student performance
and persistent inconsistencies from
classroom to classroom. Looking back
on the implementation of Children
Achieving, several central office staff
told us that they had relied too much
on decentralization in the beginning. As
one told us, when Children Achieving
began she had been in favor of:
Pushing money down to schools. In
theory this is what we should do. But I
don’t think it’s worked….Some schools
are doing OK. But I go in plenty of
schools where the principals don’t even
know all of their funding sources. I think
we do need to tie money to outcomes
in a way. We need to be more
prescriptive about what schools do with
61
money when they’re not performing.
Another central office leader indicated
that the early focus on decentralization
had led to confusion in the field. He
also concluded that central needed to
make decisions with more certainty.
We were very ambivalent about the
balance between central and local
decision-making — it caused a lot of
confusion. There was too much
emphasis on school-based decisionmaking at the beginning. We need
62
strong central decision-making.
Central office staff felt that
decentralization placed too much of a
burden on schools, and that many
schools weren’t ready to take more
responsibility for the work of reform. In
the absence of school time, interest,
and/or capacity to make curricular
61

Field notes, March 2000.
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decisions, central office should fill the
void.
The theory is that eventually schools
should be able to do all these things for
themselves. But, is that practical
without more help in the schools? If
schools got more help, maybe, but we
can’t afford it. I don’t see how.
Somebody has got to do this work. If
we [central office personnel] don’t,
who’s going to do it?63
The accountability system in particular
placed considerable pressure on the
whole district to improve, especially
when combined with the core belief in
“doing it all at once.” As the PRI
growth targets became harder to reach
without significant improvements in
student achievement, concerns rose
about how to compel school personnel
to engage in reforming their practice.
Schools could eke only so much
“growth” from the PRI’s non-testing
elements. Promotion rates and student
and staff attendance rates were already
high in most elementary and middle
schools, persistence rates were not very
malleable, and after an initial explosion
in the proportion of students tested,
increases in that area leveled off as
well. Some central office leaders felt
that unless school personnel were
forced to improve curriculum and
instruction, the credibility of the entire
reform was in jeopardy. This excerpt
from our field notes describes one
leader’s concerns.
‘The further along we go without
paying enough attention to curriculum
and instruction, more and more schools
63
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are not going to meet their
[accountability] targets.’ He feels that
this will undermine the accountability
system, as the goals set for progress
become ‘unrealistic.’ ‘The goals must
be attainable and staff must feel that
the incentive system has integrity and is
reasonable.’64
Central office leaders became
convinced that more prescriptive
approaches were necessary. As one of
them told us, “If we keep pushing
accountability without pushing
curriculum and instruction, we could
bring the system down.”

REFORM OVERLOAD:
THE EFFECT OF “DOING IT
ALL AT ONCE”
Another factor that played a part in the
evolution of the central office role over
the course of Children Achieving was
the pressure of the core belief that the
whole system must be reformed
simultaneously and immediately.
“Doing it all at once” created reform
overload throughout the School
District, from schools to the central
office. It was a strong contributor to
school staff’s inability to focus their
efforts around clearly defined and
manageable instructional priorities.
Cluster staff worked hard to win
teacher support and to assist them, but
they were hampered by the sheer
number of District initiatives and
directives that they had to implement.
Many clusters were unable to fully
develop or implement their own reform
strategies because so much time was
spent promoting and disseminating

Field notes, April 1997.
64

Field notes, November 4, 1999.
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information about new central office
policies and programs that the schools
were required to implement.
Some central office staff, particularly
those who were not among the
Superintendent’s close advisers, were
also overwhelmed by the volume of
reform initiatives. This concern was
evident very early in the Children
Achieving initiative. In an early policy
meeting, when several of the
Superintendent’s inner circle had left
the room, one central office leader said
“We need to talk about priorities and
make some tough, hurtful choices and
let the chips fall where they may. We
can’t pretend anymore that we can do
it all.” Another central office leader
agreed using the analogy that “We
can’t plow all the streets. Which ones
are most important?” He suggested
that focus should be placed on a group
65
of schools or a few clusters. But when
the inner circle members returned and
the other participants briefed them on
what happened in their absence, there
was no mention of the concern about
reform overload.
This reluctance to tell the
Superintendent and his closest staff
about the difficulty of “doing it all at
once” continued throughout the reform
effort. In an interview two years after
the exchange quoted above, a District
leader told us:
I’ve got to tell you something else. We
are on innovation overload! As hard as
it is for a Superintendent in a large
district, someone has to have the guts
to say it…Everyone is tired…[Central
65
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office personnel] are having to learn
something new all the time, we’re
rolling out so many competing forces.
[Begins counting on his fingers.] We
have the CSP. We have SLC. We have
School-to-Career. We have service
learning. We have multidisciplinary
projects. And there is more to come.
That is just one hand! We have
judgments against us in federal courts
that push us to make things not fall
through the cracks…There’s always a
66
new priority.
The urgency of “doing it all at once”
created pressure on central office staff
simply to “roll out” the reforms and
move on to the next priority. There was
little time to support or guide the
reforms or to receive feedback from the
field and review and revise policy. It is
not surprising that, to schools and
clusters, central office policy felt like
unsupported mandates. The core value
of “doing it all at once” increased the
top-down mandates by the central
office, conflicting with the core value of
school autonomy.

SUMMARY OF CORE VALUES’
EFFECT ON CENTRAL OFFICE
ROLE
Figure 1 summarizes the effects of the
core values and the four roles of the
central office outlined in Children
Achieving — standards setting,
capacity-building, holding schools
accountable, and monitoring equity —
on School District policy. It shows how
the values of school autonomy, the
need for incentives and the primacy of
results initially led the central office

Field notes, November 1996.
66
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toward decentralization and the
avoidance of mandates. But, equity
concerns and the need to reform the
system simultaneously and immediately
pushed the central office in the
opposite direction, toward more
prescription.

In the next section of the report, we
examine the capacity of the central
office and the contextual and
implementation issues that help explain
this shift away from school autonomy.

FIGURE 1. DIAGRAM OF CORE BELIEFS AND VALUES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CENTRALIZATION
AND DECENTRALIZATION IN THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA
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THE CAPACITY OF
THE CENTRAL OFFICE
AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF
CHILDREN
ACHIEVING

A

fter several years of reform,
central office leaders believed
that taking a more
prescriptive approach than
was initially envisioned in Children
Achieving was their only recourse for
improving instruction. But, the direction
in which central office leaders chose to
take Children Achieving was also
influenced by the central office’s
capacity to support the reforms and
their perceptions of school capacities.
In this section, we focus on the financial
resources, human capital, and social
capital of the central office, and
describe how serious limitations in
those areas led to missteps in
implementation. We also discuss the
effects of contextual issues on the
implementation of the reform, and their
impact, in turn on the capacity of the
central office.

THE CAPACITY OF THE
CENTRAL OFFICE
Spillane and Thompson67 present a
three-part definition of the capacity of
67

J.P. Spillane and C.L. Thompson, “Reconstructing
conceptions of local capacity: The local education
agency’s capacity for ambitious instructional reform.”
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school districts. The three elements of
capacity they identify include:
•

Financial resources allocated to
staffing, time, and materials;

•

Human capital, or the commitment,
disposition and knowledge of
district staff; and

•

Social capital, or the relationships
among school district staff that
create (or hinder the creation) of
positive group norms, such as
collaboration, trust, etc.

We begin by discussing the School
District’s financial resources.

FINANCIAL RESOURCES
Philadelphia is not a wealthy city. Due
to a drastic decline in the number of
jobs available, White/middle class flight
from the city, and a changing economy,
Philadelphia’s population decreased
dramatically from the 1970’s to the
1980’s, and so did its middle class tax
base. During that decade, the total
population of the five largest U.S. cities
— Philadelphia among them —
decreased by nine percent, while the
population living in poverty grew by 22
68
percent. When David Hornbeck began
his tenure as Superintendent, the city
was still recovering from a serious fiscal
crisis in which it was forced to borrow
$150 million from its employee pension
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 19 (1997),
pp. 185-203.
68

W.J. Wilson, The truly disadvantaged: The inner
city, the underclass, and public policy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 46.
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fund just to stay afloat. And with its
credit severely damaged, the city had
to pay more than $5 million to obtain
the loan, a fee equivalent to a 24
percent interest rate.69
With that history as a backdrop, the city
refused to provide significant additional
resources for Children Achieving,
arguing that it had “stretched its taxing
ability to the limit.”70 But the full
implementation of Children Achieving
required significant additional funding,
more than the $30 million generated
annually by the grant,71 and its design
assumed that more funding would be
forthcoming. Launching the initiative
was a calculated risk that the
Annenberg Challenge grant could be
used to improve performance, and that
improved performance would generate
the political will to obtain increased
funding either through the city, the
courts, or the legislature. By 1997, the
Superintendent, the Board of
Education, the City Council, and the
Mayor all agreed that it was the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that
was not upholding its fair share of the
costs of educating Philadelphia’s
students.
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being used inefficiently in Philadelphia
and that the District’s teacher contract
was a major obstacle to improvement.
In their view better management and a
better contract were prerequisites for
additional state funds. The state did
provide Philadelphia with some onetime grants in addition to the funding
from the formula, but these were small
in comparison to what the School
District said it required to support the
Children Achieving reform agenda. The
School District and the city used many
strategies to induce the state to
provide additional funding — multiple
lawsuits, brinksmanship, public scolding
— to no avail. Fiscal crises became one
of the few constants of the Children
Achieving reform era.
Without new financing from the state,
per pupil funding in Philadelphia was
well below what was spent in its
surrounding areas. In 1997, Philadelphia
spent $6,812 on each public school
child. Compared to wealthy suburban
school districts such as Jenkintown,
Lower Merion, and Radnor, the gap was
73
as much as $5,443 per student.
Teacher salaries were also higher in
72

But, state officials did not see it that
72
way. They believed that funds were
69

M. de Courcy Hinds, “A $150 million loan buys
Philadelphia some time,” The New York Times (1991,
January 6), p. 14.
70

School District of Philadelphia, Realities converge,
revisited: School district sees gains on test scores
and management efficiencies, but fiscal crisis is at
hand. Philadelphia: Author, 1998, p. 26.
71

Though a significant source of discretionary funds,
the $30 million from the Annenberg Challenge grant
was equal to only about two percent of the $1.5
billion annual budget.

The funding that Pennsylvania provides to each
school district currently is based on a funding
formula which takes into account the number of
pupils, the special needs of the district, its ability to
raise local taxes, and other factors. However, the
state froze the formula in 1993, which meant that
state aid to the District did not rise in response to
increases in enrollment and poverty in Philadelphia.
In actual dollars on a per-pupil basis adjusted for
inflation, the real value of state education funds
coming to Philadelphia annually between 1993 and
1998 actually decreased by 5.9 percent. (See J.
Century, A citizen’s guide to the Philadelphia school
budget. Philadelphia: Greater Philadelphia First,
1998.)
73

School District of Philadelphia, Realities converge,
revisited, p. 11.
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suburban areas. Starting salaries in the
suburbs were more than $3,500 higher
than starting salaries in Philadelphia
and maximum salaries were more than
$9,000 higher.74 Average teacher
salaries in Philadelphia also fall below
statewide teacher salary averages.

District personnel to receive
professional development, to develop
curriculum, and to work with
colleagues. It also hampered the
District’s ability to compete to hire the
most qualified personnel. Teachers, in
particular, had to make a real
commitment to urban education (or
find themselves unable to obtain a job
in a wealthy suburb) to justify the lower
starting salary, which was further
reduced by the city tax on wages.
Scarce resources also limited the ability
of the School District to provide up-todate curriculum materials and
technology. For example, a major effort
to wire every school for computer
networking and Internet access was
delayed when the District discovered
that, although it could pay for
installation, it did not have enough
money to operate the networks. And
budget hearings in both 1996 and in
1999 revolved around parent and
student testimony that textbooks in the
schools were inadequate and out of
date.

According to the School District,
expenditures on administration were
also declining, but they counted the
cost of the Teaching and Learning
Network (TLN), professional
development specialists based at the
cluster, as an instructional expense.
Critics who counted the TLN among
“administrative” costs contended that
expenditures on administration actually
grew over the course of Children
75
Achieving. Whether administrative
costs grew or not, there was no doubt
that the number of staff assigned to the
central office was smaller at the end of
the reform than it was before it. To
close a budget deficit, over 350
administrative jobs were cut in fiscal
year 1997.76 One district leader told us
that his staff of nine had been a staff of
nearly 300 a decade earlier.77
The School District was definitely a
system of scarce resources. This scarcity
limited the School District’s ability to
provide time for teachers and other
74

Ibid, p. 29.
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See, for example: S. Snyder, “No cash crisis in
schools: Philadelphia’s problem is management, says
an accounting firm hired by the state legislature.”
The Philadelphia Inquirer (1998, November 13). T.
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Field notes, January 28, 1997.

HUMAN CAPITAL
The capacity of the central office to
support the Children Achieving reforms
was an issue not only of financial
resources, but also of human capital.
With the exception of a few key
leaders, knowledge about the
substance of the reforms and the
expertise to implement them was
generally limited, even in the central
office. While many central office staff
members were passionately committed
to Children Achieving, some had only a
superficial understanding of the reforms
they were supposed to help schools
implement. And much of what they
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were trying to implement existed only
in theory prior to Children Achieving.
At the outset of Children Achieving,
systemic reform was a fairly new
concept nationally and few anticipated
the demands it would place on teachers
and schools. In Philadelphia, very little
attention was paid to the professional
development of central office staff. This
was clear when, in autumn 1996, some
central office leaders were still
questioning whether standards were
78
curriculum. Most of the
Superintendent’s inner circle was
knowledgeable and thoughtful about
standards-based, systemic reform, but
many other staff at the central office
did not have a clear understanding of
these areas. As one member of the
Superintendent’s inner circle put it,
using the SAT-9 assessment categories
to rate the capacity of the central
office,
The capacity is ‘basic to below basic.’
The primary reason for this is [central
office personnel] never have spent the
considerable amount of time it takes
with people at the cluster level and
school level to evolve a shared
understanding of what change is about.
For example, they have spent time
developing standards without time
spent with folks discussing instructional
approaches. Each individual has been
left to invent this, and so there is an
unevenness with what people have
developed and sometimes there is also
79
inconsistency.
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Another told us:
I looked at schools and clusters and
despite their best efforts, they needed
a boost — direct, hands-on
intervention, and I found that we didn’t
80
have the capacity to do that.
Limited knowledge was just one
explanation for this inability to provide
“direct, hands-on intervention.” Other
human capital issues affected central
office capacity. Budget cuts resulting
from the tight financial resources of the
School District, as well as the shift to
the cluster structure, had decreased the
number of staff in the central office, so
there were fewer people available to
do more, and increasingly demanding,
work. The focus on the Children
Achieving core value of “doing it all at
once” also tied up central office staff in
an endless rollout of initiatives, as
described earlier.
Poor personnel decisions and turnover
in staff also limited central office
capacity. The Associate Superintendent
in charge of the initial development of
the reform and the leader of the
Superintendent’s transition team
resigned in protest over the
Superintendent’s insistence on
promoting teacher accountability. A
well-regarded central office leader was
demoted for refusing to submit a
resignation letter early in the reform. A
deputy superintendent retired. Over
the course of the reform, there were
three different leaders of the Office of
Leadership and Learning, four directors
of Information Technology (including
two acting directors), three directors of
the Office of Best Practices, three
80

Field notes, November 1998.
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Managing Directors, and two directors
of the Office of Curriculum Support.
Additionally, in late 1998, two key
leaders of external partner groups left
Philadelphia to pursue new positions
elsewhere, further isolating the School
District from key constituencies. Their
replacements maintained relationships
with the central office, but they were
not as close to the Superintendent and
their presence was not as strong.

challenges to the development of social
capital in the School District of
Philadelphia. We focus on the culture of
the District and its history of reliance on
line authority and the relationship of
the central administration with its
potential partners.

Staffing turnover and ineffective
leadership over the course of the
reform plagued the departments most
directly responsible for providing
support to the field — the Office of
Leadership and Learning, the Office of
Curriculum Support, and the Office of
Best Practices. Staff hired to fill these
vacancies were not, in general,
compatible with other members of the
leadership group and some gained
reputations as “stallers” — people who
81
put up obstacles to reform. One
central office leader admitted, “Central
office personnel decisions have not
been good ones.”82

SOCIAL CAPITAL
Social capital is a product of
relationships among people. For
example, a group of people that trusts
each other has a form of social capital.
All other things being equal, a trusting
group is more likely to succeed at a
given task than a group whose
members do not trust each other.83 In
this section, we describe some
81
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Spillane and Thompson, “Reconstructing
conceptions of local capacity.”

LINE AUTHORITY
Establishing and respecting line
authority — a system where power and
influence were defined by the number
of staff one controlled — was a strong
cultural norm in the administration of
Hornbeck’s predecessor, Constance
Clayton. The goal of Children Achieving
to foster local control and “turn the
School District on its head,” was a
direct challenge to that long-held and
strongly-embedded belief. The
selection of the Superintendent himself,
who was educated as both a lawyer and
a minister, but not as an educator, was
the first in a series of decisions that
flouted this hierarchical system.
Initially, the “new” central office was
simply layered over the old, creating
two parallel worlds, the reform world
and the old world. This concern
became apparent as work teams,
established to design, plan, and
implement Children Achieving, found
their plans frustrated by the “stallers” in
key support departments, such as
finance, information technology, and
transportation.84 One central office
leader noted that “the other offices do
not get reflected in the workplans or
the goals or,” his colleague finished his
sentence, “in change. It benefits them
to be left out.” While at first there was
84
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some reluctance to try to integrate
Children Achieving into the fabric of
District operations, the District’s reform
leaders concluded that they must try.
As one meeting participant noted, “It’s
a big task, but it’s essential. When we
do not do that, one part of the system
is doing Children Achieving and one is
doing standard work.”85 Eventually, with
the help of external partners, the
central office succeeded in integrating
Children Achieving into the goals and
operating budget of the whole School
District, but not until halfway through
the reform effort.
The importance of line authority
continued to assert itself throughout
the reform, however. Initially, cluster
leaders were envisioned as “critical
friends” for principals, and so were not
required to have the authority to rate
principals in annual evaluations. But,
cluster leaders who lacked rating
authority found that many principals
ignored them. They clamored for a
superintendency certificate so they
would be the line officer for principals
and could have some kind of influence
in the schools in their clusters. By spring
1997, all cluster leaders were given line
authority over the principals in their
cluster.
RELATIONS WITH POTENTIAL
PARTNERS
The development of social capital in the
School District was also affected by the
central administration’s relationships
with potential partners, including the
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, its
own cluster leaders, state officials, and
the business community.
85
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THE PHILADELPHIA FEDERATION OF
TEACHERS
The School District’s relationship with
the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers
(PFT) suffered over the course of
Children Achieving and was
characterized by mistrust on both sides.
In a sense, the School District
administration was at war with its own
teachers. The PFT strongly objected to
key components of Children Achieving,
particularly to its accountability
provisions. They objected to spending
money on cluster staff when they felt
schools were understaffed. Leadership
of the PFT felt that Children Achieving
was a threat to the union and to hardwon work rules outlined in the teacher
contract. Tensions were highest when
the School District administration
attempted to reconstitute two high
schools, plans which were ultimately
halted by an independent arbitrator
who ruled that the District had failed to
engage in the necessary consultation
with the PFT. To PFT representatives,
the reconstitution attempt was just one
example of the Hornbeck
administration’s pattern of excluding
the PFT from the decision-making
process.
School District leaders, for their part,
told us that the PFT representatives
were invited to meetings about relevant
policy areas, but they either obstructed
the meetings they attended or never
showed up. Central office leaders felt
that the PFT leadership was adversarial
and unreasonably attached to the
unproductive rules and regulations of
an antiquated contract, and that the
PFT had the interests of teachers, not
children, at heart. In our estimation,
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both groups behaved badly. In four
years of meeting with and interviewing
central office staff and PFT
representatives, we did not hear a
single positive comment from either
group about the other.

organizational structure, were
supposed to improve and align
instruction across a feeder pattern of
schools and lead and support local
professional development and
community engagement efforts. Cluster
leaders were members of the
Superintendent’s cabinet, which also
included key central office leaders.

The acrimony evident on both sides of
this relationship made progress
difficult. The School District and the
PFT were unable to agree on
contractual changes that would have
supported Children Achieving,
especially in the area of
decentralization. School communities
could not select their own principals
and staff, as Children Achieving
advocated, and there was conflicting
language about local school councils in
the Children Achieving plan and the
86
PFT contract. Additionally, the failure
of the School District to gain
concessions from the PFT undermined
its credibility with a number of
stakeholders, particularly with principals
and the business community.
CLUSTER PERSONNEL
In addition to an antagonistic
relationship with the leadership of the
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers,
the School District also often alienated
its own cluster leaders, who were
crucial to reform implementation.
Cluster leaders were, for lack of a
better term, regional superintendents,
who under Children Achieving’s new
86
The language of Children Achieving called for 35
percent of households to vote to determine council
membership; in the teachers’ contract the provision
was for five parents to be selected by the Home and
School Association. Additionally, Children Achieving
called for two-year terms for parents, while the
contract outlined one-year terms for teachers. See
Christman, Guidance for school improvement in a
decentralizing system.

With the addition of 22 cluster leaders
(rather than the six regional
superintendents), the Cabinet ended up
being a large group of about 50
people, a size that was ill-suited for
collaborative work. Cluster leaders
came to describe Cabinet meetings as
the place they came to talk about
decisions that were already made by
central office staff. Cabinet meetings
were also one of the few forums they
had to air their grievances: Central
office staff often felt “ganged up on”
87
by cluster leaders. For example, one
Cabinet meeting was particularly
contentious. Cluster leaders were upset
that more information was not available
as to how they would finance and
organize summer school programs,
scheduled to begin about three months
from the time of the meeting. They
made little effort to hide their anger
and hostility from researchers present
88
at the meeting.
This tension arose in part because of
conflicting ideas about the cluster role.
Whereas central office staff used
clusters primarily as vehicles for
informing the field about new aspects
of the reform, many cluster leaders saw
their role differently. They resented
87
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what they perceived as central office’s
intrusion on their work agendas. In the
following excerpt from our field notes,
a cluster leader illustrates this point:
Part of the challenge I have had as a
cluster leader is to keep the central
office away from me, so I can allow my
people to develop their responsibilities.
Downtown keeps adding more [stuff] to
our plate…Let me give you an example.
The central office wanted to change the
special ed formula, which apparently
they had been working on for months,
but it wasn’t shared with anyone [in the
field]. When it was finally announced,
parents went to the Board and begged
them not to let it happen. So the Board
then asked the school district what facts
they have to support the change, so
now we [cluster staff] have to do a
lengthy survey. We have to identify one
special ed kid per special ed classroom
and review their [education plan],
observe their classroom, interview the
parent and teacher, and we have to do
it all in four weeks. That’s 75 kids for
me because we have 75 special ed
classrooms. The central office knew that
they would ask us to do this in the
summer, but they didn’t actually ask us
until a couple of weeks ago. This says
to me that I have to put a hold on
everything else I’m doing and do this. It
89
takes away from your focus.
This unproductive dynamic endured
even when central office staff were
aware of time and turf concerns and
made efforts to seek cluster leader
input and plan with respect to cluster
schedules. In the 1999-2000 school
year, the Superintendent asked the
cluster leaders to support him in a fight
89

Field notes, April 1996.
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for fair funding from the state and they
refused.
STATE OFFICIALS AND THE BUSINESS
COMMUNITY
The School District’s relationship with
state education officials, the Governor,
and the state legislature also was
strained over the course of the reform.
When Hornbeck became
Superintendent in 1994, there was a
Democratic Governor and Democratic
majorities in both houses of the state
legislature. He came to his position with
strong backing from both Philadelphia’s
mayor and its business community.
However, just three months into his
administration, the political landscape
in Pennsylvania and Philadelphia
changed dramatically: the state elected
a Republican governor, Tom Ridge, and
Republican majorities in the state
legislature who were committed to
reducing government spending.
Relationships between the state
officials and the District were tested by
the new governor’s advocacy of
vouchers, his refusal to grant the School
District significant additional funds, and
the Superintendent’s inflammatory
response: allegations of racism on the
part of state officials via a federal civil
rights lawsuit against the state. When
we interviewed state education
department officials in the fall of 1999,
their anger toward David Hornbeck was
evident.
This antagonistic relationship between
the state and the School District had
effects on local constituencies, as well.
The strong backing of the business
community deteriorated as Hornbeck’s
battles with the state and its pro-
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business agenda became more public.
The clearest sign of the fracture in the
alliance between the business
community and the School District was
when Greater Philadelphia First — a
coalition of Philadelphia business
executives that served as the fiscal
agent for the Annenberg Challenge —
supported Governor Ridge’s plan for
school vouchers.

out the reforms and supports. In order
to capitalize on the momentum built up
from the hiring of the new
Superintendent and the acquisition of
the Annenberg funds and to fulfill the
underlying belief to “do it all at once,”
there was a rush to implementation.
Another underlying belief, that “strong
incentives are necessary” to induce
people to adopt good practices,
contributed to a full court press to
develop the accountability system.
After clusters, the accountability system
was the first major component of
reform to be implemented, with
baseline scores appearing in 1996.

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
IMPLEMENTATION
The central office’s limited capacity
naturally had enormous implications for
the implementation of the reform effort
and contributed to their retreat from
decentralization. We discuss below two
major implementation issues — poor
sequencing of the reforms and
underestimation of the time and
support needed to implement the
reforms — that were both a result of
and contributed to the central office’s
limited capacity to support Children
Achieving. Table 1, the Reform
Implementation Timeline, is included
below to provide a brief guide to the
timing of major reform initiatives and
contextual events.

SEQUENCING AND ROLLOUT
OF THE REFORMS
One of the primary implementation
flaws of Children Achieving was the
sequence in which the District rolled

But to many, instituting accountability
policies before developing the
infrastructure to support achievement
was putting the cart in front of the
horse. School personnel complained
that they were being held accountable
for performance targets before
teachers had received the new
standards, and before all 22 clusters
were in place, and long before the
development of the Curriculum
Frameworks offered a modicum of
guidance and summer institutes offered
teachers rich opportunities to examine
their practice. All of this contributed to
perceptions by teachers and principals
that they were being asked to carry
disproportionate amounts of the
burden for improvement. They felt
victimized by the ways in which the
reforms were presented and rolled out.
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TABLE 1. REFORM IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE OF EVENTS:
CHILDREN ACHIEVING AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA
August 1994
June 1995
August 1995
December 1995
April-May 1996

David Hornbeck begins his tenure as Superintendent.
Annenberg Challenge grant awarded to School District.
First six clusters formally established.
Standards writing teams convened.
SAT-9 administered district-wide in grades 2, 4, 6, 8, and 11.

July 1996

Summer institute (four-day professional development program) conducted for
teams of teachers on standards-based instruction.
Draft standards distributed to all teachers for review.
16 other clusters established.
Standards Curriculum Resource Guides distributed to teachers.
School district forecasts $104 million budget shortfall for 1997-1998 school
year.
Standards in reading/English/language arts, science, mathematics, and the Arts
officially adopted by Board.
Announcement of plans to reconstitute two high schools.
Superintendent, Board President, City Council President, and Mayor publicly
blame state funding formula for financial problems in Philadelphia schools;
“Draw a line in the sand” pledging no further cuts in school-based programs;
and file a lawsuit alleging that the state had failed to meet its constitutional
obligation to provide a thorough and efficient education.
Cluster leaders given line authority over the principals in their cluster.
City Council adopts budget that assumes significant new state contribution.
Draft standards in Health and Physical Education, Social Studies, and world
languages distributed to all teachers.
Standards in final three subjects adopted by Board.
Reconstitution decision reversed by arbitrator after appeal by Philadelphia
Federation of Teachers.
Summer institute for teachers on content standards for RELA, math, and
science (1,100 participants).
PRI scores for 1996 and 1997 announced publicly, gains celebrated.
Week-long professional development session on content standards (600
participants).
Development of curriculum frameworks begins.
Curriculum frameworks for ELA, math, science, and social studies distributed to
all schools.
SAT-9 scores adjusted to correct error by test publisher (two schools removed
from “low progress” list).
State legislature committee on restructuring Pennsylvania’s urban schools
proposes break-up of Philadelphia School District.
District forecasts $85 million budget deficit for the 1998-1999 school year.
District files federal lawsuit against state, alleging civil rights violations based on
funding formula that discriminates against poor and minority students.
State passes Act 46, colloquially known as the “state takeover bill.”
SAT-9 administered district-wide in grades 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, and 11.
City Council adopts School District budget, relying on letters of credits from
banks to avert an early school closure in the 1998-1999 school year.
Board adopts new graduation and promotion supports and requirements.
Annual summer content institute held.
School District celebrates second consecutive year of test score gains.

August 1996
September 1996
October 1996
December 1996
February 1997

Spring 1997
May 1997

July 1997

September 1997

October 1997
January 1998

February 1998
March 1998

April 1998
May 1998
June 1998
July 1998
August 1998
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TABLE 1. REFORM IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE OF EVENTS:
CHILDREN ACHIEVING AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA
(CONTINUED)
September 1998
January 1999
March 1999
April 1999

May 1999
July 1999
August 1999
January 2000
February 2000
April 2000
May 2000

June 2000

PRI Cycle 1 rewards and sanctions announced.
Expert panel appointed to review accountability system.
David Hornbeck’s contract extended for two more years after much
speculation.
School District presents budget to City Council with projected $94 million
deficit for 1999-2000 school year; refuses to make further cuts.
Backed by mayor, admission procedures reinstituted for some small learning
communities.
SAT-9 administered.
City Council adopts School District budget; state makes “one-time”
contributions to help cover the deficit.
Annual summer content institute held.
School District announces third year of test score gains, points to “warning
signs” that progress is waning.
Proficiency exams piloted in grades 9 and 10.
School District projects $200 million deficit for school year 2000-2001.
SAT-9 administered.
City Council adopts budget submitted by board with no new money for the
programs the Superintendent felt were required to fully implement Children
Achieving. Consequently, implementation of new supports and requirements
postponed for promotion from eighth grade and for graduation.
David Hornbeck announces his resignation.

Central office personnel frequently
reinforced these perceptions. They
would often work long and hard to
produce a tool intended to help school
or cluster personnel complete a
necessary function, only to undermine
their work by failing to contact the field
in advance and springing the new tool
on them at the last minute. One central
office leader described the problems
with the execution of school-based
budgeting.
In two recent instances, the execution
of policy has broken down. One was
the budget rollout this year. We worked
very hard inside. The operational
budget and the categorical budget
were done together and budget forms
were done on disk. But the rollout was

terrible. The presentations were poor
and the disks were hard to use…The
policy, the idea, the coordination was
terrific but the implementation was
weak.90
Other supports were also rushed in
their development and implemented in
questionable sequence. In a late 1998
policy meeting, central office leaders
lamented that the Curriculum
Frameworks had been developed
before the graduation and promotion
requirements had been completed.
What Hess91 might regard as the
“symbolic” reforms, such as structural
90

91

Field notes, April 1997.

F.M. Hess, Spinning wheels: The politics of urban
school reform. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 1999.
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changes and accountability
mechanisms, were implemented first; it
was not until later that the more
difficult work of transforming
classrooms — the proverbial “horse” —
began. Philadelphia leaders did make
these so-called ‘symbolic’ changes first,
but in part it was due to their core
belief in incentives. Accountability
mechanisms were developed first
because they produced the strongest
incentives for improvement, and
student achievement did improve
immediately. However, as central office
staff began to realize that those
incentives were not powerful enough to
improve teaching on a large scale, they
turned to more prescriptive
approaches.

UNDERESTIMATION OF TIME
AND SUPPORT
Transforming instruction to a
constructivist approach demands much
of everyone, particularly those who
work in schools. The architects of
Children Achieving, and the central
office staff leading the implementation,
underestimated how much time and
support it would require. Transforming
instruction requires new curriculum and
deep changes in teaching that occur
only over extended periods of time and
with intensive support. The central
office did not provide teachers with the
curriculum materials needed to do the
job, and the accountability system tried
to push improvement with time
constraints that were unrealistic.
Teachers were not trained adequately
for standards-based instruction, and
many held beliefs that ran contrary to it.
Opportunities to participate in contentbased professional development, work
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collaboratively with other teachers,
observe expert colleagues, and receive
coaching in their own classrooms were
eventually increased, but remained
inadequate to the enormous task and
the demands of the accountability
system.
Again, this implementation issue is
partly attributable to some of the
beliefs underlying the reform,
particularly the motto “do it all at
once.” There was an urgency about the
reform effort, especially during the
initial years of Children Achieving, that
was admirable but that contributed to
the underestimation of what it would
take to improve the entire district. The
urgency stemmed from several sources.
In the initial months of the reform
effort, its leaders were driven primarily
by their passionate desire to improve
conditions for children. They also
believed that obtaining additional
funding hinged on improved
performance. Later in the reform effort
this urgency was fed by the state’s
threat to take over the district.
Faced with these demands, central
office leaders responded with an
endless rollout of information about the
reforms to clusters and schools. They
acted as though teachers learned
through knowledge transmission, even
while they were encouraging teachers
to use constructivist pedagogy with
students. Constructivism, as noted
earlier, rests on the ideas that learning
is social and requires active
engagement among teachers and
learners. While there was
acknowledgment of the need for this
approach to student instruction, there
was little recognition of the need for
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teachers and other school staff to have
the same type of learning opportunities
to help them understand how to
implement a constructivist, standardsbased system.
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LESSONS FOR
REFORMING
DISTRICTS

T

his report describes how both
the policies and rhetoric of
District leaders and central
office staff in Philadelphia
changed over the course of the
Children Achieving reform, shifting
from a focus on decentralization toward
a more prescriptive approach. Central
office personnel saw this as a rational
response to what they encountered as
they attempted to implement the
reforms. The limited capacities and
willingness of school staffs to
implement many of the programs were
major obstacles to reformers. Left to
their own devices, many school staffs
floundered and others selected
strategies that were inconsistent with
the central office vision, particularly
with constructivism, the pedagogical
approach promoted in Children
Achieving.
Our own research in the schools
suggests that there were serious
capacity problems in the schools, and
there certainly was resistance to some
of the central tenets of the reform. The
evaluation team observed many
examples of dysfunctional school
communities, well-meaning but underprepared teachers and principals, and
questionable instructional practices that
sacrificed content and meaning for
prescription and order. But the capacity
of school staffs to improve teaching
and learning was only one of the
reasons for the shift from school

39

autonomy to more central office
prescription. The second section of this
report described the insufficient
capacity of the central office to support
school-initiated reforms, the flaws in
implementation that occurred, and the
contradictions inherent in Philadelphia’s
theory of action. These problems also
forced the central office to become
increasingly reliant on mandates,
directives, and centralized authority. In
the end, Philadelphia’s leadership did
not have the strategic vision, the
resources, or the patience to support
school-based reform.
What might other school districts
undertaking systemic reform learn from
the Philadelphia experience? Our
analysis of central office policy,
implementation, and capacity during
Children Achieving suggests that school
districts would probably experience
greater success if local leaders:
•

Clarified roles and values;

•

Acknowledged the varying
capacities of personnel at all levels
of the district;

•

Collaborated with and showed
respect for stakeholders;

•

Understood how schools perceived
standards;

•

Maintained focus and managed the
burden on school employees; and

•

Recognized the trade-offs between
alignment and autonomy.

We elaborate on these lessons in the
remainder of this report.
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CLARIFY ROLES AND
VALUES
The implementation of Children
Achieving was hampered from the
beginning by conflicts between the
basic beliefs underlying the reform and
the roles assigned to the central office
in plans for carrying it out. Early in this
report we identified five foundational
values underlying Children Achieving —
the primacy of results, the importance
of equity, the value of increased school
autonomy, the need for strong
incentives, and the imperative to “do it
all at once.” We also discussed the four
roles assigned to the central office in
the Children Achieving Strategic Action
Design: setting standards, building
capacity, holding schools accountable,
and monitoring equity. Each of these
roles offered opportunities for central
office staff to assume increased
authority and reduce school autonomy.
Given the early implementation
problems, the resistance of the
teachers’ union, and the vast majority of
school employees to components of
the reforms, and the promise to
produce results, it is understandable
that the central office staff were
tempted to take full advantage of these
roles to specify the reforms in the
schools. Initially, the capacity-building
role was most problematic for central
office staff. It seemed to be in direct
conflict with the core values of school
autonomy and focusing on results.
Capacity-building implies provision of
guidance and guidance implies
direction.
Two of the other central office roles —
holding schools accountable and
monitoring equity — were closely
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linked in Children Achieving’s theory of
action. Our analysis shows that the early
results from the accountability system,
combined with a strong emphasis on
equity, led the central office to develop
stronger and more prescriptive signals
to schools about what and how to
teach. Annual student achievement
testing revealed inequities associated
with race and ethnicity, family income,
and language background. Despite
their commitments to autonomy and
results, central office personnel
convinced themselves that more
prescriptive approaches were necessary
to ensure that all students had fair
opportunities to learn. Outcomes could
not be separated from opportunities to
learn. As the central office became
more prescriptive in the name of
equity, they became increasingly less
concerned about ensuring that school
personnel had the freedom to make
their own decisions.
Of course successful implementation of
reforms does not mean blindly
following an initial plan. Indeed, some
authors identify the ability to alter plans
as an important characteristic of
92
successful implementation. However,
we believe that Philadelphia’s shift to
more prescriptive approaches reflected
confusion about central office roles and
values, distrust of school personnel and
the absence of a coherent capacitybuilding strategy rather than a
thoughtful response to the needs of the
field. Prescription itself is not always
bad, nor is school autonomy always
desirable. However, once roles and
responsibilities for carrying out reforms
92

For example, see R.F. Elmore, “Getting to scale
with good educational practice.” Harvard
Educational Review, 66 (1996), pp. 1-26.
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were defined, staff needed reasonable
opportunities to enact them. This
meant time, materials, and training. It
also meant maintaining some
coherence in policies and actions. In
Philadelphia, the initial rhetoric about
decentralization was not matched with
the time or support needed to make it
work. Instead, as school staffs struggled
to understand and use their newlygranted autonomy, they were almost
immediately overwhelmed with new
central office mandates. This shift bred
anger, mistrust, cynicism, and
resistance in the schools and it
ultimately undermined the
implementation of the reforms.
Other districts embarking on systemic
reform should delineate roles and
responsibilities carefully, and should
then act in a coherent and consistent
manner. Assignments should be based
on hard-headed assessments of
capacity and motivation to improve
rather than ideological commitments to
ideas like decentralization. Leaders
should avoid assigning responsibilities
to employees who lack either the
knowledge or motivation to carry them
out. Rather, they should provide the
direction, scaffolding, tools, materials,
training, and incentives necessary to
help acquire increased competence as
they make progress. The experience of
success can be a powerful motivator to
acquire new knowledge and skill.

ACKNOWLEDGE VARYING
CAPACITY
Another lesson from Children Achieving
is that both district and school capacity
must be considered before taking on
large-scale reform. School and cluster
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personnel perceived Children Achieving
as a one-size-fits-all reform effort.
Everyone had to do it all, all at once,
and all the same way. Despite early
efforts to give schools more autonomy,
teachers and principals experienced the
reforms as mandates from above.
Promises to allow some flexibility in
how reform initiatives like small learning
communities were carried out were set
aside when district-wide standards were
set and then used for evaluative
purposes. Some school and cluster
personnel bristled at central guidance
that they felt disregarded the
experience of principals and the
expertise of teachers, while others
clamored for more guidance. Similarly,
Children Achieving assumed that all
central office staff had the knowledge
and ability needed to design and lead
their parts of the reform effort.
Like schools, central offices, depending
on their staffing and other resources,
vary in their capacity to define and
support reform. The School District of
Philadelphia did not have the capacity
to take on such an ambitious reform
effort, at any level of the system, and
insufficient efforts were made to
improve the system’s capacity. The
School District lacked the finances
needed to conduct its regular operation
and, hence, supports for the reform
initiatives were often under-funded.
Resource scarcity limited the School
District’s ability to provide time for
teachers and other District personnel to
receive professional development, to
develop curriculum, and to work with
colleagues. It also hampered the
District’s ability to hire qualified
personnel for key positions in schools
and in the central office. High turnover
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in key staff positions and cuts in
administrative staff based at the central
office further exacerbated the capacity
problem.
Other districts should address this issue
upfront when planning large-scale
reform efforts. To do this, districts
might sequence the implementation of
components so that support can be
concentrated, spend more time
educating personnel about reform
elements prior to implementation, and
delay accountability consequences until
personnel have received sufficient
opportunities to develop the necessary
skills and the tools needed to do the
work.

COLLABORATE WITH AND
SHOW RESPECT FOR
STAKEHOLDERS
The District’s limited capacity to
support Children Achieving was not
simply a matter of scarce fiscal
resources. Lack of skill in negotiating
relationships with constituencies such
as the Philadelphia Federation of
Teachers, the state, and the business
community contributed to conflicts that
had extremely negative impacts on the
implementation of Children Achieving.
These conflicts might have been
avoided or managed more effectively.
Teaching, even within small learning
communities, is demanding work and it
is by and large private work. Its efficacy
depends on both the commitment and
the competence of the practitioner. If
you attack them as a group, you will not
gain their commitment. If you do not
provide them with timely opportunities
to acquire new skills and with the tools
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they need, you will not build their
confidence that they are competent to
make the changes. If you send them
mixed messages, they will rely on the
approaches they know best. The
Philadelphia District leaders did all of
these things and failed to win the
commitment of their teaching force to
the reforms. Philadelphia leadership
consistently underestimated the
importance of developing and
maintaining relationships with these
important stakeholders. They
discounted constituent perspectives,
experiences, and ultimately, their
power to hurt or help the School
District. Other districts considering
systemic reform efforts should work to
collaborate with key stakeholders
whenever possible and, at minimum,
give respect to their perspectives and
experiences.

MAINTAIN FOCUS
Perhaps the most compelling and most
onerous belief underlying Children
Achieving was that all aspects of the
reform had to be implemented at once.
Hornbeck’s assertions that every part of
the system plays a role in student
achievement, that piecemeal reform
does more harm than good, and that
comprehensive efforts were needed to
achieve significant improvement initially
inspired Philadelphians. While it is true
that enormous effort is needed to
transform troubled urban school
systems, as Children Achieving wound
down, it became clear that “doing it all
at once” had been an ill-conceived
strategy.
“Doing it all at once” stretched the
limited capacity of the system to the
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breaking point by asking District
personnel to design, implement, and
understand a large set of reforms in
quick succession. It contributed to poor
sequencing and mixed signals. Since
everything was a priority, the time and
support required to implement various
components of reform was routinely
underestimated. Reform overload
became a major obstacle to successful
implementation. There was little time to
prepare the ground for the reforms, to
build capacity, or to receive feedback
from the field and review and revise
policy. It is not surprising that, to
schools and clusters, central office
policies felt like unsupported mandates.
The core value of “doing it all at once”
increased the sense of top-down
control by the central office, conflicting
with the initial efforts to increase school
autonomy and leading to further
centralization.
Children Achieving illustrates how focus
can be lost when a sweeping vision and
ambitious improvement plans are
pursued at a furious pace. Staff at all
levels of the District expressed
frustration with reform overload. Our
research and the research literature in
general are clear that maintaining focus
over time is essential to substantive
educational improvement. This was
difficult in Philadelphia due to the
number of reforms being implemented
simultaneously and the gaps between
the amount of time provided to
implement them and what was actually
needed. Other districts attempting to
take on ambitious reforms should not
sacrifice their strategic vision of systemwide transformation, but they should
think through how they sequence their
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actions, and keep the burdens
manageable.

USE STANDARDS
CAREFULLY
Under Children Achieving, one of the
functions of the central office was to set
standards. As the central office staff
recognized the need to provide schools
with more guidance about how to carry
out the reforms, they drew on this
authority. In addition to content and
performance standards, the central
office staff defined “process” standards
that spelled out acceptable practice in
a variety of areas. They set standards
for local school councils, small learning
communities, professional
development, teaching practice,
project learning, service learning, the
comprehensive support process, and so
on. These standards were perceived by
central office staff as a benign form of
guidance, and as different from
mandates. Standards, in their view,
implied advocacy for quality rather than
exercise of authority and control.
However, to school staff, these
“process” standards were just
prescriptions in another form. And as
cluster and central office staff used
these various sets of standards to
determine whether schools were
complying with the reforms, they clearly
were viewed as regulatory mandates.
Simply calling them standards did not
change the fact that they felt like
regulations to the school staffs.
Other districts can learn from this
experience. If the idea of standards is
to define an ideal state of affairs, then
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deviation should be expected across
contexts. This is especially true of
“process” standards. In a decentralized
environment, the central office can
simply acknowledge that there will be
deviations across contexts, maybe even
encourage it, and focus on results
rather than compliance, or they can
define the parameters of acceptable
behavior and the conditions under
which deviations will be permitted. But
it is probably important to distinguish
between how standards and regulations
are applied, and what the
consequences are for deviation. The
former imply some professional
legitimacy, some basis in knowledge or
experience, but also targets to be
worked toward rather than rules to be
complied with.

RECOGNIZE THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN ALIGNMENT
AND AUTONOMY
The problems of implementation were
serious in Philadelphia, but we have
concluded that there was a design flaw
in Children Achieving that was even
more serious. As described in the
introduction to this report, systemic
reform assumes well-aligned
accountability and assessment systems
and local control and development of
curriculum. The idea is that a central
authority (a state, or in Philadelphia’s
case, the School District’s central office)
sets content and performance
standards and holds schools
accountable, but gives schools the
opportunity to determine the best
means of reaching those standards. In
theory this includes control over their
budgets, their personnel, and their
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curriculum. What we believe to be the
flaw in this theory is that high-stakes
accountability and assessment systems
are not tolerant of diverse curricula. If
schools are to be held accountable for
what students learn, the assessment
system must be aligned with what
teachers teach. There are two ways this
alignment can be achieved: the central
authority can prescribe the curriculum
or it can create strong incentives for
teachers to align their curricula with the
assessment. If the assessment offers no
options and measures specific
knowledge and skill, then the results
are similar in either case. The concepts,
facts, and skills children should know
and be able to do (as identified in
content standards), and the specific
subject matter, learning activities, and
their general sequence, are prescribed
either through curriculum policy or
assessment specifications. Central
office staff may tell school staff that
they should attend to the content
standards rather than to the test. They
may tell them that they have the
freedom to develop their own curricula
based on the content standards. Initially
in Philadelphia, with the stakes high
and teachers’ confidence in students
low, schools chose to focus on the SAT9 test and opt for test preparation as
the core curriculum. Later, the central
office began to see tests as “the tail
that wags the dog” and strove to use
assessments in lieu of curriculum to
specify curriculum and restructure
courses of study.
We are not suggesting that centralizing
curriculum is a better way to reform
schools. Rather, what our experience in
Philadelphia reveals is that there is a
trade-off between heavy reliance on
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uniform assessment systems and school
and teacher control over curricular
content in high-stakes accountability
environments. Paradoxically, systemic
reform promises high alignment and
high autonomy. It cannot deliver both.

decentralized approach to curriculum to
a highly centralized one was complete,
and it was the District’s response to the
trade-off between alignment and
autonomy.

The Philadelphia central office staff
lived out this contradiction as they
worked to implement Children
Achieving. Initially, they focused on
decentralizing authority to schools, and
giving school staff opportunities to
make their own decisions. They set
standards and established an
accountability mechanism that included
incentives for schools to improve their
performance. They were criticized
because the test they selected did not
match their standards perfectly, so they
worked to improve the alignment. They
were also criticized because the
accountability system seemed to be
encouraging increased test preparation
in the District’s classrooms. Some, in
turn, criticized the teachers for their
failure to understand that the creative
constructivist approaches would work
better than test preparation.
As results from the testing pointed out
the wide disparities in outcomes and
fair opportunities to learn for lowincome students, students of color, and
English language learners, the central
office sought to even the playing field
by further tightening the alignment
between what was tested and what was
taught. As the Hornbeck administration
came to an end, central office staff and
the Board of Education were
developing new tests in every subject
area for grades 7-12. These tests were
intended to clearly signal to teachers
what to teach. The shift from a

Mandating a specific curriculum or
creating tests that drive the curriculum
are two of the options facing school
districts trying to promote system-wide
reform. These ideas lack appeal to
progressive educators who value
teacher and school autonomy and
creativity. Giving schools and teachers
complete authority over what they
teach is another option, but it would
leave districts with no way to compare
schools or to identify and remedy
inequities in the distribution of
achievement. This option also ignores
the lesson laid out earlier in this section,
about the need to acknowledge the
varying capacities of schools and
teachers. Some teachers and some
schools, provided the opportunity,
would do well given the chance to plan
all their curricular activities and the
resources to enact them, but others
would flounder. Not every school’s staff
is equally ready for nor able to
capitalize on the responsibility that
accompanies this degree of autonomy.
If both alignment and autonomy are
valued, school districts could design
more flexible policies that address the
need for both. For example, districts
might create curricula that cover some
proportion of the school year, perhaps
50 percent. District-wide assessments
would focus on the mandated
curriculum. For the other half of the
year, schools and teachers would be
free to develop and follow their own
curricula and assessments. Another
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option would be to trade off alignment
for autonomy by giving schools that
meet rigorous performance criteria —
including performance on standardized
tests, as well as other, more qualitative
measures of achievement and capacity
— freedom from some or all of the
curricular or testing requirements. Yet a
third option would be to offer schools
alternative assessments and let them
determine which best aligns with the
curriculum of their choice. A fourth is to
offer teachers and students options
within a common assessment
framework. This is the approach used
successfully by the Cambridge
Overseas Evaluation Syndicate. The
current trend seems to be to pursue
tighter alignment at the expense of
school autonomy, but if the
Philadelphia experience is any guide,
this may not be the most fruitful choice.
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REMAINING
QUESTIONS AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS

T

he Philadelphia School District
is the nation’s sixth largest with
nearly 215,000 students — 80
percent of whom are children of
color, and 80 percent of whom live in
poverty. Philadelphia's composition and
problems are fairly typical of other
large urban districts: problems such as
limited finances, poor labor relations,
and deteriorating support from key
constituencies. Educators, researchers,
and policymakers who are considering
the implementation of system-wide
reform face the challenges of
translating a broad vision into practice,
and doing it in a timely way before yet
another generation of students is left
behind.
It is hard to improve education practice
system-wide in a large school district. It
is hard because policymakers cannot
mandate the commitment and
motivation required of teachers and
students. It is hard because systemic
reform requires a focused effort to
build internal capacity. It is hard
because fundamental changes in
attitudes, beliefs, and traditional
practices are required. It is hard
because these are costly endeavors and
urban school districts need additional
resources and political support to make
these changes happen. It is hard
because it takes time to make the
changes in teaching and learning
needed to produce meaningful results.
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The School District of Philadelphia is
one of the few large urban school
districts that has attempted an
ambitious systemic reform without
being mandated to do so by a court,
state, or mayoral takeover. Although
many mistakes were made in theory,
design, and implementation, Children
Achieving offered some positive lessons
as well. Urban school district leaders
can, as Philadelphia has shown us, offer
a vision of improvement, reorganize an
entrenched bureaucracy, and
implement standards and
accountability. Understanding how to
encourage and create widespread
improvements in teaching and learning
is the next crucial step. While Children
Achieving fell far short of the vision of
re-energized learning communities that
motivated its architects, it did raise
expectations for the city’s children and
reframed the debates about the future
of public education in Philadelphia.

